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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Uniform Commercial Code,' the security interest con-
cept is not grounded on a static relationship between debtor and
secured party. The relationship may be affected by an expansion or
contraction of the security interest in two ways: (1) the amount of
collateral which is subject to the security interest may increase or
decrease, and (2) the indebtedness with which the collateral is charged
may vary. Therefore, any security agreement may include an after-
acquired property interest, a future advance interest, or both. The
purpose of this article is to examine the treatment which future ad-
vance interests should receive under the Uniform Commercial Code.
This involves two questions: (1) what must be done by the secured
* B.A. Claremont Men's College, 1965; LL.B. Harvard Law School, 1968; London
School of Economics and Political Science, 1963-64; Member, American Bar Association,
Arizona Bar Association, Maricopa County Bar Association; Associate, Snell & Wilmer,
Phoenix, Arizona.
Hereinafter referred to as the Code. Unless otherwise specified, all citations are to
the 1962 Official Text.
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party to create and fully validate his interest in future advances; and
(2) assuming that the interest is valid, how does it rank compared
to other interests in the same collateral that arise between periodic
advances?
If the law validates a future advance interest and fully protects
it against interference from other interests, the effect is to permit the
rights of the secured party to date from the time the security interest
first arises, instead of from the time advances are actually made. Eco-
nomically, this form of loan transaction has certain advantages. From
the debtor's point of view, a future advance arrangement may enable
him to spread the loan repayment over a longer period than he nor-
mally could. Of course, the debtor is under no obligation to repay a
loan until it is made, but by spreading out the time for making loans
the time for repayment is likewise extended into the future.' At the
same time the creditor saves the use of the funds until they are
actually advanced.3
 In addition, depending upon the bargaining posi-
tion of the parties, the debtor may convince the creditor to commit
to make future advances at the current rate of interest. The effect of
this, of course, will depend upon the ups and downs of the money
market, but the debtor may find an advantage in a source of future
funds at today's interest rates. Finally, a promise of funds to come
in the future, even if it is an optional or unenforceable promise, may
demonstrate confidence in the debtor that he can translate into good
will in the operation of his business.
For either party, the future advance transaction saves the cost
and time of refinancing each transaction as funds are periodically
advanced; frequent filings, legal fees, and searches of the record may
be avoided. In practice, however, the future advance device is prob-
ably most favorable to the creditor. He may make an optional ad-
vance agreement whereby he is not bound to make advances in any
stated amount or at any stated times. Even if the creditor commits
himself to obligatory advances, he will probably be cautious enough
2 Of course a creditor could, if he wished, make a single large loan and provide for
installment repayment of principal, but it is not certain that creditors will often be willing
to do this, because they can achieve the same result with greater protection by use of
the future advance interest.
3 Occasionally, the lender will pay all amounts to be loaned to an escrow agent, to
be disbursed according to the terms of the escrow agreement. Technically, this is not a
future advance interest at all. It has been distinguished most clearly in Maryland. Wat-
kins, Maryland Mortgages for Future Advances, 4 Md. L. Rev. 111, 127 (1940). But see
Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 271 P. 898 (1928) where a similar
arrangement was treated as a mortgage for obligatory future advances. The escrow ar-
rangement may be unique to real estate financing, but in the case of personality a similar
analysis is presented when the lender credits the full amount of the loan to the debtor's
account, even if the debtor agrees to draw on the funds at intervals.
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to include an escape clause triggered by an adverse change in the
debtor's credit position or by a decline in the interest rate. Thus, the
creditor creates for himself a favorable future market for his product.
Furthermore, there is a likelihood that the creditor with a future
advance interest will be the first party to whom the debtor looks when
he feels the need for additional funds and thus will be constantly
informed of the level of the debt being carried by the debtor. Finally,
in the case of construction and crop loans, or loans which are coupled
with an after-acquired property clause, the value of the collateral
may be increasing along with the amount of the indebtedness, thereby
making future advances as secure, economically, as the first advances,
or even more so.
II. VALIDITY OF THE FUTURE ADVANCE INTEREST
A. Pre-Code Law
The legal justification for allowing future advances developed in
England, at a time when the title theory of mortgages was popular.
Under this view, the title to the collateral, not merely a lien or charge
on it, passed to the creditor. Since the mortgagee held the full legal
title as security, it was very easy for courts to hold that the creditor
could retain the title as security not only for loans presently made,
but also for future loans if the arrangement so stipulated. Although
many American jurisdictions preferred the lien theory of mortgages,
the future advances device was readily accepted from English prac-
tice.' Soon, however, the mortgage for future advances was shown to
have serious disadvantages.
Debtors were unfamiliar with the future advance interest and
did not understand the extent of the security interest they granted.
More importantly, if the loan agreement covered and fully protected
all future advances, debtors soon realized that they were forced to
obtain all their funds from the creditor who first advanced them
money since no other creditors were willing to lend funds when there
was a risk of being subordinated to an unsuspected future advance.
The greatest adversity to the mortgage for future advances arose
when creditors turned them into outright fraudulent and preferential
arrangements. Secured parties engaged in the practice of buying up
claims against their debtor at substantial discounts and adding these,
to their established priority at full face value, thus making a profit
on the transaction at the expense of unsecured creditors.
These practices led to statutes requiring the mortgage to state a
maximum amount of loan, so that at least a subsequent creditor might
4 3 G. Glenn, Mortgages § 399, at 1603 (1943).
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be put on his guard. The purpose of such remedial legislation was to
prevent liens on property for amounts and claims never contemplated
by the parties in the initial transaction. Thus, Comment 8 to Section
9-204 of the Uniform Commercial Code states:
At common law and under chattel mortgage statutes there
seems to have been a vaguely articulated prejudice against
future advance agreements comparable to the prejudice
against after-acquired property interests. Although only a
very few jurisdictions went to the length of invalidating
interests claimed by virtue of future advances, judicial limi-
tations severely restricted the usefulness of such arrange-
ments. A common limitation was that an interest claimed in
collateral existing at the time the security transaction was
entered into for advances thereafter was good only to the
extent that the original security agreement specified the
amount of such later advances and even the times at which
they should be made.'
B. Code Law
The judicial and legislative hostility to unlimited future advances
seems not to be shared by the Uniform Commercial Code" Section
9-204(5) provides that "[o]bligations covered by a security agree-
ment may include future advances or other value whether or not
the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment." 7 However,
even this simple sentence is subject to conflicting interpretations. The
language seems to validate future advances to a very wide extent, and
it clearly allows for optional advances. Since an optional advance
may not be contemplated as a very realistic possibility when the
parties sign the security agreement and yet is still within the coverage
of 9-204(5), the Code policy on future advances may be subject to
the same criticism that appeared in the "Dragnet" cases under pre-
Code law. As an example, suppose that a debtor gives a security
interest for an advance of one dollar which is perfected by a filed
notice covering "inventory." Later, another creditor lends a large sum
of money on the same inventory, and perfects his security interest.
Still later, the original lender takes a new security interest, again in
the same inventory, that was not contemplated by the parties at the
time they made the first security agreement. Does the original notice
determine the rights of the parties so as to drag the third loan ahead
of the second by virtue of the first agreement? Professor Coogan, one
5 	9-204, Comment 8.
6 Comment 8 to § 9-204 continues: "L'Ilhis subsection validates the future advance
interest, provided only that the obligation be covered by the security agreement." Id.
7 	9-204(5).
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of the draftsmen of Article 9 of the Code, has indicated that this
is the exact meaning of 9-204(5). 8
Section 9-204(5) does not necessarily go this far. Comment 8
to that section says that the Code validates the future advance in-
terest "provided only that the obligation be covered by the security
agreement."' This language implies that being covered in the security
agreement is a condition of validity when future advances are con-
cerned. Thus, it is arguable that the security agreement must mention
specifically that future advances are contemplated in order for them
to be "covered."" Viewed in this way, 9-204(5) would be in line with
the pre-Code "Dragnet" cases that close the original security interest
to claims against the debtor which are unrelated to the course of
financing and not contemplated by the parties. In any case, the burden
on the secured party will be small, for he will probably use standard
form loan contracts which provide for optional advances.
So far, the Code case law in the area supports the more restric-
tive reading of 9-204(5). Coin-O-Matic Service Co. v. Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Co.11 held that if any claim to priority as of the original
advance will be made for future advances, the security agreement must
provide for such future advances. "That is to say, a single financing
statement in connection with a security agreement when no provision
is made for future advances is not an umbrella for future advances
based upon new security agreements, notwithstanding the fact that
involved is the same collateral."'
A more difficult point is presented in the Coin-O-Matic case,
however, by the court's dictum that "in all of these cases a lender
can protect himself against the situation involved herein by providing
in the original security agreement for future advances."" The court
here was concerned with an intervening creditor, but it is difficult to
understand how a future advance clause in the security agreement
helps the intervener. The security agreement is not required to be
filed, and the financing statement, which is filed, need only contain
the address of the secured party, from whom information may be ob-
tained, the address of the debtor, and a statement of the types or a de-
8 A Practical Approach to the Uniform Commercial Code for the Practicing Lawyer,
19 Bus. Law. 5, 51-2 (1963).
U.C.C. 9-204, Comment 8.
10 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property 932 (1965).
n 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1112, 4 C.C.H. Instal. Credit Guide 11 98,142 (Super. Ct.
R.I. 1966). See also In the Matter of Rivet, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1087, 4 C.C.H. Instal.
Credit Guide {I 97,858 (ED. Mich. 1967); Safe Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Berman,
393 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1968). But cf. In re Merriman, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 234 (S.D.
Ohio 1967).
12 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1120, 4 C.C.H. Instal. Credit Guide ¶ 98,142, at 88,816.
13 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1117, 4 C.C.H. Instal. Credit Guide 1[ 98,142, at 88,814.
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scription of the items of collateral." Therefore, a statement about
future advances in the security agreement is of no aid whatsoever to a
potential creditor to whom the record discloses only the barest outline
of a prior transaction.
Should the potential creditor ask the prior lender his intention
in regard to the making of future advances, the Code does not require
the prior lender to answer.' In view of this result, what rationale
is there for requiring the security agreement to provide specifically
for future advances? There is none, given the Code as it now exists"
because the potential creditor cannot compel the prior lender to dis-
close the contents of his security agreement. Even by using the debtor
information procedures of 9-208 the potential creditor will probably
not be able to ascertain the prior lender's intentions in regard to
future advances.
Under the provisions of 9-208, the creditor must furnish certain
information to the debtor concerning the state of the obligation.' 7
The debtor states what he believes to be the aggregate amount of
unpaid indebtedness as of a specified date and presents this informa-
tion to the creditor for correction or approval. If the secured party
fails to comply with this request for approval, he may claim a security
interest only as shown in the statement against persons misled by
his failure to comply. The theory of 9-208, as explained in the com-
ments thereto, is to avoid requiring the secured party to disclose the
details of his business to any casual inquirer or competitor." Any
subsequent creditor, before making a loan to the common debtor,
may force the debtor to use the 9-208 procedure to obtain information
for the purpose of establishing his credit and proving which of his
assets are free of claims.
14 U.C.C. § 9-402 (1).
15 Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent
Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice Filing," 47 Iowa L. Rev. 289, 344-45 (1962).
See also Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured
Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 838, 876 (1959) ; but see California
Law Revision Commission, Recommendation and Study Relating to Mortgages to Secure
Future Advances, C-11 n. 11 (1958).
After a thoughtful consideration of the problems raised by the future advance inter-
est, one writer has commented that "all persons who voluntarily become creditors have
ready access to credit information under the Code's filing system." Priority of Future
Advances Lending Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 128, 150
(1967). Statements of this type are seriously misleading because: (1) they do not always
apply to potential creditors, infra p. 7; (2) as to actual creditors, only those with Code-
created interests will benefit, infra p. 7; and (3) even as to actual creditors with a Code
interest, the operation of 9-208 is ambiguous, infra p. 7.
16 None insofar as the other creditors are concerned, at least. Of course, the agree-
ment between the debtor and the future advancer must provide for future advances in
the sense that both agree to the future advance interest, because the parties are bound
only by the bargain which they have actually made. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-201,
11 U.C.C. § 9-208.
15 U.C.C. 9-208, Comment 2.
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At least two faults are found with this system. First, the theory
of 9-208's use by the subsequent creditor assumes that he has suffi-
cient bargaining power to compel the debtor to act. If this happens
not to be the case, the subsequent creditor is virtually at the mercy
of the prior advancer. Second, even if the subsequent creditor is
successful in obtaining information from the prior creditor, it is not
clear exactly what measure of protection 9-208 will afford him against
a future advance. Suppose, for example, that the priority issues to
be discussed later are resolved so that the first advancer is entitled
to full priority for his future advances against any intervening ad-
vancer. When asked for a statement of indebtedness unpaid as of a
specified date, he replies "$X.xx and all other sums which may be
advanced in the future." It is not certain that this is allowable under
9-208, but if it is, it has a discouraging effect on any potential creditor.
Furthermore, 9-208 may be construed to exist completely outside the
priority rules. Therefore, an intervening creditor may take subject
to future advances even if the prior advancer does not correct the
9-208 statement to mention that future advances are covered by his
security agreement. The same types of problems exist with after-
acquired property interests and the attempt to ascertain which items
of the debtor are subject to claims. In that context, it has been sug-
gested that to make 9-208 viable "[s]ome form of estoppel certificate
or other agreement by the first secured party is needed in order to
permit the inquirer to assume that any new credit extended by him
will not be subject to greater prior claims than those he is told are
outstanding." 1° The same suggestion may be made with respect to
future advances.
In sum, 9-208 in its present form indicates that a future advance
clause in a security agreement is of minimal help to a potential inter-
vening creditor. Also, it should be remembered that so far only inter-
vening creditors who take a security interest have been considered.
There are other possible interveners, such as judgment lien creditors,
statutory lienors, and even buyers who will have no recourse to 9-208's
meagre protection by way of notice but who may nevertheless be
subject to future advances made under 9-204(5). With respect to
these interests, it is fruitless to insist that the security agreement
contain a specific provision for future advances, as did the Coin-0-
Matic court.
C. Extra-Code Law
Although a future advance clause in a security agreement pro-
vides scant notice to subsequent parties, such a clause should be
19 Comment, Priority of Future Advances Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 35
U. Chi. L. Rev. 128, 345 (1967).
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included for non-Code reasons. The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 20
provides that a security interest may, in certain situations, be prior
to a filed notice of tax lien. As discussed later, there are three sections
of the new Tax Lien Act which accomplish this result with a greater
or lesser degree of completeness. Since it is uncertain which of the
three provisions is most likely to be of most service to the secured
creditor, he will do well to comply with all three. One of them, section
6323 (c) (2) (A), requires an "agreement . . . to make loans to the
taxpayer." 2 ' The phrasing of this section indicates that the agreement
in which the security interest is embodied must contain a provision
for future advances if such advances are to be claimed as prior to
the tax lien.22
 This interpretation is in harmony with case law under
the pre-1966 tax lien provisions which generally required that the
future advances must be under, and pursuant to, a security interest
which by its terms purports to secure subsequent loans.' Some courts
have displayed a notable dislike for claims that future advances should
come prior to the federal tax lien. In United States v. Automatic
Heating & Equip. Co. 24
 a loan was made under a real estate trust deed
which provided that the collateral secured "[i]n addition to the above
described indebtedness ... any and all other indebtedness due ...." 20
The court held that there was no valid future advance interest because
"indebtedness due" meant only indebtedness presently due and could
not be stretched to cover indebtedness which may become due in the
future. Thus, the wise lender should include in his security agreement a
clear statement of his interest in future advances. In addition to com-
plying with the possible Tax Lien Act requirements, he will fall within
the Coin-O-Matic rationale and any ambiguities in 9-204(5) should
be resolved in his favor.
In some jurisdictions, requirements relating to the maximum
amount or timing of future advances may exist because of incomplete
repealers when the Uniform Commercial Code was adopted.' Mary-
20 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6321-6325.
21 Id.
	 6323(c) (2) (A) (1).
22 Cf. W. Plumb and L. Wright, Federal Tax Liens 79 (2d ed. 1967).
23 E.g., United States v. Peoples Bank, 197 F.2d 898, 900 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Edison
Bank v. Mayer, 202 F. Supp. 620, 624 (D.N.J. 1962).
24 181 F. Supp. 924 (ED. Tenn. 1960), affd, 287 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1961).
25 181 F. Supp. at 925.
26 California specifically retained such a provision by adding 9-312(7) to its version
of the Code:
(7) The secured party takes priority as to the future advances specified below from
the time his security interest was originally perfected:
(a) If a maximum amount to be secured is stated in the filed financing
statement (or in a security agreement where a financing statement is not required
to be filed), as to all advances up to that amount outstanding at any one time
(without regard to advances already repaid or discharged), whether the making
of such advances is optional with or obligatory upon the secured party;
(b) If a maximum amount to be secured is not so stated, as to all obligatory
8
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land provides an example. Prior to adoption of the Code in 1963,
Maryland provided, with certain exceptions not relevant, that "no
mortgage to secure future loans or advances shall be valid unless the
amount or amounts of the same and the times when they are to be
made shall be specifically stated in said mortgage This statute
has never been specifically repealed. The Code provides for a general
repealer in section 10-103, but this provision has not been uniformly
adopted. And even with the general repealer, it is not perfectly clear
that any pre-Code state restriction on the validity of future advances
is "inconsistent" with 9-204."
Even if the future advance interest is valid between the parties,
it may be defeated by creditors. As early as 1812, it was argued that
a mortgage covering future advances was fraudulent. Two Connecticut
cases indicated that it might be, but the United States Supreme Court
indicated otherwise." One of the early treatise writers noted that as
a general rule a mortgage securing future advances was not a fraudu-
lent conveyance." This seems to have laid the issue to rest, but one
wonders whether things should be reconsidered in light of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act." Under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of that Act,
a security interest may be set aside if the debtor: (1) is or will be
rendered insolvent, (2) retains an unreasonably small capital, or (3)
believes he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay and if the
security interest is taken without giving "fair consideration" in ex-
change." Although, as will be seen later, there is a dispute as to the
meaning of "value" in the Code," the meaning of "fair consideration"
advances, and as to all optional advances made by the secured party without
knowledge of an intervening right; and
(c) In all cases, as to advances and expenditures made by the secured party
for the protection, maintenance, preservation or repair of the collateral.
Accrued interest has the same priority as the advance or expenditure to
which it relates. Repayment in full of amounts owing under a security agreement
covering future advances does not extinguish the security interest of the secured
party.
This subdivision (7) does not apply to conflicting security interests in the
same collateral, priorities among which are governed by subdivisions (3), (4),
and (5) of this section.
This addition was repealed, however, after a short time. See note 73, infra. Cal. Comm.
Code § 9312(7) (West 1964), repealed, Cal. Comm. Code § 9312 (Cum. Pocket Part
1967).
27 Md. Ann. Code art. 66, § 2 (1957).
28 See generally Comment, Effect of Code Passage Upon Unrepealed Conflicting
Statutes, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 496 (1962).
29 Compare Pettibone v. Griswold, 4 Conn. 158 (1822) and Stoughton v. Pasco, 5
Conn. 442 (1825) with Shirras v. Craig, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 34, 50 (1812) (dictum).
39 G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences 641 (1940).
31 9B U.L.A. 70 (1966). The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (U.F.C.A.) is
currently in force in about half of the states. V. Countryman, Debtor and Creditor 184
(1964).
32 U.F.C.A. §§ 4-6.
U.C.C. § 1-201(44).
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in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act is more clear, and more
troubling.' "Fair consideration is given for [the security interest when
it] is received in good faith to secure a present advance ... in amount
not disproportionately small as compared with the value of the
[security interest]. 135
 (Emphasis added.) Thus, in the previously con-
sidered hypothetical case the debtor gives a security interest in all
of his inventory for one dollar and the prospect of optional future
advances, a fraudulent conveyance may be made out if a creditor
can prove the necessary elements under the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act.
The trustee in bankruptcy could make the same attack on a
future advance interest under Sections 70(c) or (e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act,' which gives the trustee the powers of actual and certain
hypothetical creditors. The future advance interest may also run
afoul of the trustee's power under Section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy
Act" to reject contracts which are executory in whole or in part.
This section is ambiguous. "As long as there remains any part of a
contract unperformed, the contract is executory . . .”" but does
70(b) reach every loan agreement where the debtor has not fully
performed because payments are due and unpaid or not yet accrued?
The language of section 70(b) is too broad. In the normal loan situ-
ation, the creditor has fully performed his half of the contract by
the advancement of funds, and when the contract is fully performed
by the nonbankrupt party, 70(b) has been held not applicable." In
the future advance situation, however, if the contract is only partly
performed on both sides, the trustee's challenge under 70(b) may
succeed. The law does not clearly answer this question, and although
trustees have not pressed 70(b) to its literal extreme, they may decide
to do 80. 40
34 P. Coogan, A Suggested Analytical Approach to Article 9 in Secured Transactions
Under Uniform Commercial Code 284 n.32 (1967).
35 U.F.C.A. § 3(b).
36 11 U.S.C. §§ 110(c), 110(e) (1964). E.g., In the Matter of Rivet, 4 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1087, 4 C.C.H. Instal. Credit Guide 97,858 (ED. Mich. 1967). See U. Chi. L.
Rev., supra note 19, at 143 n.52.
37 11 U.S.C. § 110(6) (1964).
38 4A Collier, Bankruptcy 522 (14th ed. 1967).
39 Cf. In re Forney, 299 F.2d 503, 506-507 (7th Cir. 1962). But cf. In re New York
Investors Mutual Group, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
ao In addition to sections 70(b), 70(c), and 70(d), the trustee has a potential weapon
in section 60(a) (8), which provides that transfers to secure a future loan shall have the
effect of a transfer for new and contemporaneous consideration if the future loan is
actually made. But if anticipated future advances, either optional or, obligatory, are not
made to the extent anticipated, does the negative inference of section 60(a) (8) mean that
any security interest for loans that actually were made is preferential? Two commenta-
tors would say no, one because of section 60(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, Seligson, Slade,
Kaltman, Levinson, Ruben & Spellman, Floating Liens and the Bankruptcy Act, 13 Prac.
Law. No. 8 at 59, 61 (Dec. 1967), and the other on the reasoning that section 60(a) (8)
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III FUTURE ADVANCE PRIORITIES
A. Pre-Code Rules
Before exploring the priority problems of the Code, it is helpful
to review the pre-Code American and English law in the area." In
America, a distinction was drawn between future advances which the
secured party was obligated by the terms of the loan contract to make,
and those advances which were characterized as "optional." As to
obligatory advances, it was the unanimous rule that, given proper
notoriety, subsequent lienors and encumbrancers took subject to ad-
vances required to be made in the future. The theory protecting
obligatory advances was that the future advance was part of the
original debt, and that the lien for this advance related back to the
time the debt was created. As a practical matter, most courts felt
compelled to protect the creditor who was required to make the
advance and who had no power to prevent the debtor from placing
liens on the collateral which would otherwise be preferred. This doc-
trine was sometimes restricted in its application by local statutes,
such as the Maryland statute that was examined earlier, but in
general terms the lien for obligatory future advances stood on very
firm footing in America.'
On the other hand, the lien for optional advances did not en-
counter such smooth sailing, despite its very firm launching in the
English case of Gordon v. Graham." In that case the debtor executed
a mortgage for an antecedent debt owed the creditor and provided
that the mortgage should secure such other sums as might be lent or
advanced to him. The debtor then made a second mortgage upon the
same collateral. The Lord Chancellor of 1716 decided that "[t]he
second Mortgagee shall not redeem the first Mortgage, without paying
as well the Money lent after, as that lent before the second Mortgage
was made; for it was the Folly of the second Mortgagee, with Notice,
to take such security?" 44 Thus, the optional future advancer was pro-
tected without regard to his knowledge of an intervening interest.
Some American courts adopted the same rule, relying on the theory
ennunciated in 1716 and on the notion that the debtor's retained
interest after the first mortgage was only an equity of redemption
subject to his contractual promise that future advances would reduce
approves the principle of Code Section 9-204(5), Hanna, The Secured Creditor in Bank-
ruptcy, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 471, 482 (1960).
41 See generally 2 R. Coote, Treatise on the Law of Mortgages 1239-1406 (9th ed.
R. Ramsbotham 1927).
42 G. Osborne, Secured Transactions 282 (1951).
43 22 Eng. Rep. 502, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 598 (1716).
44 Id .
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this equity. 45
 Therefore, this was all the interest which the debtor
could transfer, voluntarily or otherwise.
In 1861, the House of Lords overruled Gordon v. Graham. Lord
Campbell noted that the previous case had been seriously questioned
by judges and treatise writers alike. More importantly, he minutely
examined the prior opinion and concluded that the report deviated
from the facts in such a way as to leave the question open. Thus,
Hopkinson v. Rolt" held that optional advances were entitled to
priority only as to those advances actually made before the first
creditor receives actual notice of a subsequent interest. Lord Campbell
pointed out that the actual notice rule is really no hardship to the
first creditor because he is fully protected for advances made prior
to actual notice, and is under no obligation to make any advances
after actual notice. Instead, he may request from the debtor new,
unencumbered security. Lord Chelmsford, concurring in Hopkinson,
felt that to continue Gordon v. Graham would, in effect, preclude
a mortgagor from borrowing money from other than the first lender.
The reasoning of their Lordships Campbell and Chelmsford must
have captured the imagination of English jurists, for in 1899 the
doctrine of Hopkinson v. Rolt was applied to future advances made
in pursuance of a covenant in the first mortgage," thus undercutting
the basic rationale of the actual notice rule. It was not until 1925
that the distinction between obligatory and optional advances was
revitalized, this time by statute. Section 94 of the Law of Property
Act provides that obligatory future advances take priority in all cases
over intervening interests. Optional advances are subject to the actual
notice rule."
In America, it has been noted, obligatory advances were protected
against intervening interests. As for optional advances, the majority
of jurisdictions adopted the actual notice rule, relying on the rationale
of Hopkinson v. Rolt.'" There was a minority rule for optional ad-
vances,' sometimes called the Michigan Rule after the case of Leduc
v. Detroit & Ill. R. R. 51
 Under this rule, the recorded mortgage to
45 E.g., Witczinski v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841, 846 (1876). Blackburn, Mortgages to
Secure Future Advances, 21 Mo. L. Rev. 209 at 228 n.67 (1956), lists Alabama, Florida,
Mississippi, and Texas as advocating the "Old English" view. But see Russell and Prather,
The Flexible Mortgage Contract, 19 Legal Bull. 73, 86-109 (1953), to the effect that the
pre-Code rule in all of these states was the actual notice, or majority rule discussed infra.
Annot. 138 A.L.R. 566 (1942).
46 11 Eng. Rep. 829, 9 H.L.C. 513 (1861).
47 West v. Williams, [1899] 1 Ch. 132.
48 L.P.A. § 94 (1925). See generally Waldock, The Law of Mortgages (2d ed. 1950).
46 Russell and Prather, The Flexible Mortgage Contract, 19 Legal Bull. 73, 86-109
(1953), presents a state by state analysis. Annot. 138 A.L.R. 566 (1942).
59 This rule is in addition to the minority view in those jurisdictions, if any, adopt-
ing the "Old English" priority rule. See note 42 supra.
51 13 Mich. 380 (1865). See note 49 supra.
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secure future advances is of notice to subsequent encumbrancers, but
constitutes a lien only to the extent of liabilities actually incurred
prior to the recording of the subsequent interest. Thus, for priority
purposes, the lien of the mortgagee attached as of the time of each
advance with no relation back; the prudent lender had to search the
record on his debtor each time an advance was to be made. This rule
is inconsistent with the normal view that all subsequent parties are
chargeable with notice of prior recorded interests, for in the case of a
mortgage for future advances, any protection for prior interests is
disregarded. Despite the Michigan and "Old English" Rules, however,
pre-Code law demonstrates a high degree of uniformity in the treatment
of the future advance interest: obligatory advances protected com-
pletely, and optional advances protected up to the point of actual
notice of an intervener."
B. Code Rules
1. The First-to-File Rule
The clearest Code priority rule with regard to future advances
is 9-312 (5) (a). It applies when both the future advance interest and
the intervening interest are perfected by filing.' One of the most
notable features of the Code is that it allows a secured party to file
his interest before there is any security agreement with the debtor."
"The justification for the rule lies in the necessity of protecting the
filing system—that is, of allowing the secured party who has first filed
to make subsequent advances without each time having, as a condition
of protection, to check for filings later than his.":" Whenever the
perfection of the security interest takes place, the priority of the
interest "relates back" to the time of filing. It should be noted at
52 In addition to the majority and minority rules, there were several one-of-a-kind
priority rules. Thus, in Illinois, a notion of limited priority developed, whereby all ad-
vances made within 18 months after the mortgage were given priority regardless of any
notice. After 18 months the Michigan rule applied. III. Ann. Stat. ch. 30, § 37a (1935). A
California court ruled that a second mortgage, duly recorded, did not prevail over fresh
advances from a prior mortgagee, but that, nevertheless, if the second mortgage is fore-
closed, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale will be prior to further advances if he records
his deed. Atkinson v. Foote, 44 Cal. App. 149, 136 P. 831 (1919). A similarly strange
transformation of priority occurred in Maryland, the jurisdiction most hostile to future
advances. In Robinson v. The Consolidated Real Estate & Fire Ins. Co., 55 Md. 105
(1880), the creditor contracted to advance construction funds from time to time. The
debtor then confessed judgment in a suit for collection of the first amount due under the
contract, With the judgment, an agreement was filed, stating that the judgment was to
be security for the repayment of all money to be loaned or advanced in the future. A
traditional mortgage with a future advance clause was filed in addition to the judgment
and the contract. The court held that the lien dated from the time of the judgment, and
that the strict state statute regulating future advances did not apply.
53 U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (a).
54 U.C.C. § 9 -402(1).
55 U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 4.
13 	 •
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the outset, then, that the Code concept of notice filing is inconsistent
with the Michigan Rule of future advances discussed above.
Example 4 in the comments to section 9-312 indicates that the
first-to-file rule operates to protect fully all future advances against
intervening Code interests perfected by filing, and the Coin-O-Matic"
case bears out this conclusion. In July, 1963, the account debtor
purchased a motor vehicle from a car dealer on the time payment plan.
A security interest was executed and assigned by the dealer to the
creditor, along with the account debtor's note. The creditor perfected
his interest by filing. In October, 1964, the account debtor was in-
debted to a different creditor and executed his note for the amount
of the debt as well as a security agreement covering the same property
as the prior interest. Later in the same year, the first creditor advanced
an additional sum to the debtor, who subsequently went bankrupt,
leaving collateral insufficient to cover the security interests of both
creditors. Because of the rather unusual setting of the case, primarily
the fact that the first security \ interest did not specifically provide
for future advances, the Rhode Island Superior Court held that the
intervening creditor was prior to the future advance made by the
first creditor. However, the court was also of the opinion that if
the original security agreement had provided for future advances, the
first creditor would have been protected against the intervener."
The first-to-file rule of 9-312(5) (a) may not be a wise one, but
it is probably still too early to tell. It is at least a clear rule, and
despite "theoretical deficiencies," it may enable a creditor to under-
take all of a debtor's reasonable money needs without fear of certain
kinds of interveners." It is interesting to note that in 1954 the New
York Law Revision Commission recommended that the protection
afforded the first filer be cut down. The Article 9 subcommittee and
the Code Editorial Board agreed to amend 9-312 as follows:
When a later secured party gives new value and perfects his
security interest in equipment, consumer goods or farm
products covered by an earlier perfected security interest,
he has priority over the earlier security interest as to any
advance subsequently made by the holder of the earlier
security interest unless the subsequent advance or a commit-
ment to make it was made before the holder of the earlier
security interest knew of the new value given by the second
secured party, or was made for the necessary protection,
58 Coin-O-Matic Serv. Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1112, 4 C.C.H. Instal. Credit Guide If 98,142 (Super. Ct. R.I. 1966).
57 Id. at 1117, 4 C.C.H. Instal. Credit Guide ¶ 98,142, at 88,814.
58 Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Hart
L. Rev. 997, 1026 (1964).
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maintenance or preservation of the collateral or any part
thereof."
The amendment would have re-established the majority rule under
pre-Code law. Although this solution has a great deal to recommend
it, the proposed amendment was dropped for reasons unknown. It
has been suggested that the episode suggests "the wisdom of making
changes in the priority rules only after experience indicates which
fears are justified and which are exaggerated.'
2. The First-to-Perfect Rule
The priority rule of 9-312(5) (a) does not apply unless both
security interests, the original lender's and the intervener's, are per-
fected by filing. If either interest is perfected other than by filing,
the priority is determined by the order of perfection under section
9-312(5) (b). Perfection is accomplished as specified in 9-303, which,
among other things, requires an attachment of the security interest,
and, under 9-204(1), there can be no attachment until value is given.
Because of the ambiguous definition of value in 1-201(44), however,
two theories have developed among Code commentators in regard
to the question of priority for the future advance interest under
9-312(5)(1)). Under the Code definition of "value" in 1-201(44) (a) "a
binding commitment to extend credit" will have the effect of attach-
ing and perfecting the obligatory future advance interest. In the case
of optional, advances, however, the result is not clear. "Any consider-
ation to support a simple contract" may constitute value under
1-201(44)(d).
Is a promise to make an optional advance sometime in the future
"value" so as to date the time of perfection? Or is "value" measured
as of each time that an advance is actually made? Two of the leading
commentators on the Code have disagreed on this point. Professor
Gilmore takes the "single security interest" view, that an optional
advance security interest attaches when the promise to make optional
advances is made, provided that some small present advance is
made"' This view is expounded by Gilmore at length, and need not
59 P. Coogan, Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," in
Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code 723 (1967). A complete draft-
ing history of the future advance interest is found in Comment, supra note 19, at 140 n.46.
60 P. Coogan, Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," in Se-
cured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code 723, 724 (1967).
01 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property 933-46 (1965). The present
advance is required to avoid a conceptual problem. If there is no present advance, there
is no obligation, and no security interest, hence nothing to which future advances can
relate back. Economically, the present advance may be valueless. It nevertheless serves as
"consideration," i.e., to solemnify the agreement between the parties and invest it with
legal consequences. Cf. Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 234 A.2d 860, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
821 (1967) ($1 constitutes value under 1-201(44) (d)).
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be repeated here. The major thrust of Gilmore's argument is that
under 9-201 the security interest is effective according to its terms
against all other interests unless the Code otherwise provides. Reading
the definition of value in 1-201(44) (especially 1-201(44) (d)) liter-
ally, Gilmore concludes that an optional advance agreement plus
binder is value, just as is a binding commitment to extend funds in
the future. At the heart of Gilmore's theory is the conceptual equation
of optional and obligatory advance arrangements. He points out that
either type of future advance agreement is analytically difficult. There
can be no specific performance to enforce the loan contract, and
damages would be limited to the increased interest rate the borrower
has to pay to get funds from another source. If there has been any
impairment of the borrower's credit position, the lender may be dis-
charged from his obligation, and even if he is not discharged, any
resultant damage to the borrower will be more from his own deteri-
orated credit position than from the natural and probable consequences
of the lender's breach. Thus, all agreements to lend money can be
breached at will without liability, and there is no reason to distinguish
an "optional" future advance from an "obligatory" one."
In all fairness, Gilmore may overstate the similarity. The language
of 1-201(44) itself implies that there is some difference between
optional and obligatory advances, at least enough to require two
separate clauses to deal with them. Also, the words "binding commit-
ment" suggest that a commitment is enforceable unless "binding" is
merely redundant. Finally, one doubts that the person making the
promise is indifferent to the form that the promise takes." Neverthe-
less, even if optional and obligatory advances are not identical in
legal concept, an optional advance clause plus a small present advance
as binder seems to constitute "any consideration," and therefore
"value" under 1-201(44)(d), just as much as a binding commitment
to extend credit constitutes "value" under 1-201(44)(a).
The counterweight to Gilmore's view is the "multiple" or "build-
ing-block" security interest theory of Professor Coogan." According
to this view, security interests are severable both as to property cov-
ered and as to debt protected. Thus, "value," in 1-201(44) terms, must
n2 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 61, at 925-31.
63 Cf. U.C.C. 9 5-115. Lenders may regard the commitment to lend an outstanding
liability. Furthermore, borrowing is usually a tailor-made process; any re-negotiation or
re-investigation of credit takes time, which may turn out to be a cost because of changes
in the terms of the loan.
94 Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Harv.
L. Rev. 997 (1964); Coogan and Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code
Upon Receivables Financing—Some Answers and Some Unresolved Problems, 76 Harv. L.
Rev. 1529 (1963); Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among
Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 838 (1959). Coogan's theory
is summarized, with counter-arguments, in Comment, supra note 19, at 137-39.
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be measured from time to time. Of course, if a creditor has committed
himself to make an advance, he has given value to the extent of the
commitment. But if the agreement is merely an optional one, no value
is given until, and to the extent that, loans are actually made. Each
advance stands on its own feet for priority purposes. Coogan reaches
his conclusion by pointing to 1-201(37) to the effect that a security
interest requires an obligation, and by inferring that the scope of the
security interest parallels the scope of the obligation. Coogan also
points out that the future advance provisions of Article 9 derived from
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act which provided that the entruster's
interest did not extend to obligations to be subsequently created."
Thus, Coogan sees a basic difference in priority between optional ad-
vances and obligatory advances under 9-312(5) (b). This difference
is justified by the predominantly psychological factors that lead banks
and other lenders very rarely to disregard their commitments, and be
extremely reluctant to obligate themselves to lend money in the future.
The multiple security interest theory is virtually identical to
the pre-Code Michigan Rule of priority which provided that the first
recorded interest took priority only for advances made prior to a
subsequently recorded interest. This was the minority view, however,
and it seems strange to impute to the Code the acceptance of a
minority position unless that result is fairly compelled from the lan-
guage of Article 9. The only conclusion that is indicated by the lan-
guage of the Code, however, is that the draftsmen were aware of the
possibility of defining value so as to limit the priority of optional
future advances, but that they did not choose to do so. Article 3,
for example, contains a special definition of value applicable only
to holders in due course. Under 3-303 a promise to give value is not
value itself, unless there is an irrevocable commitment to third per-
sons. Thus, the Michigan Rule was adopted by the draftsmen in this
context; their failure to adopt it clearly in other contexts signifies
that it is not the Code rule in those other contexts.
The same thing may be said even of the pre-Code majority rule.
Sections 9-313(4) and 9-314(3) provide that when a security interest
in fixtures or accessions intervenes between the advances of a previ-
ously perfected lender, such lender is entitled to priority only if he
makes or contracts to make the future advance before he has knowl-
edge of the intervening security interest. Since knowledge is defined
by 1-201(25) to be the equivalent of "actual notice" in pre-Code
terms, the cited sections adopt the pre-Code majority rule in regard
to the priority of future advances. Because this rule is adopted for
security interests in fixtures and accessions but not in any other part
65 If this is so, of course, one wonders why the same language was not conveniently
written into Article 9 if a similar result was desired.
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of the Code, the inference is allowable that the actual notice result
was not intended outside the confines of 9-313 and 9-314. When one
thus eliminates the pre-Code majority rule and the pre-Code minority
rule from the list of possible results under 9-312(5) (b), one is forced
into an all-or-nothing choice of priority rule. But 9-204(5) refutes
the notion that no optional future advances can be entitled to priority,
because if such were the case, these future advances could not be said
to be covered in the obligation of the original security interest. This
author therefore concludes that the single security interest theory is
the proper one to apply.
Although there is scant authority on future advance problems,
indications are that the single security interest theory will be judicially
adopted. The principal indication came from Friedlander v. Ade1phi
Mfg. Co." which adopted the single security interest view in favor
of a code security interest and against a lien creditor." The court,
acknowledging the difference of opinion between Coogan and Gilmore,
felt that "although in the instant case there was no binding commit-
ment to extend credit, [the secured party with an optional advance
interest] clearly gave 'value' for his security interest when he made
the first advance."" (Emphasis added.) Friedlander presents unusual
problems which are discussed in full in the section that deals with
judgment creditors. Nevertheless, the case should have a strong effect
outside the judgment creditor area, because the decision is based
primarily on the definition of value contained in 1-201(44)(d)." As
mentioned earlier, this definition is the key to priority contests be-
tween two secured creditors, as well as contests between secured cred-
itors and all other interests.
The Attorney General of Wyomingm also seems to be in favor
of the single security interest theory. An opinion was requested on the
effect of a future advance clause endorsed upon the certificate of title
of an automobile being used for collateral. Under the Wyoming version
of 9-302, a security interest in a motor vehicle is perfected by (1)
filing a financing statement or security agreement with the county
clerk of the county in which the vehicle is located, and (2) noting the
security interest on the certificate of title." . As presented, the question
was whether an endorsed notice of the security interest which included
a future advance clause would have "force and effect" upon persons
lending money against the automobile in the interim between the first
loan and any subsequent loans made by the first advancer. On the
00 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1968).
67 The decision is still of value in discussing the priority questions under 9-312(5) (b).
68 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 10.
69 Id.
79 1967 Wyoming Op. AtCy. Gen. No. 1, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 615 (1967).
71 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-9-302(4) (1961).
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basis of 9-204(5), the opinion of the Attorney General was that the
question should be answered in the affirmative, even though the effect
of such opinion "would be to prevent any other person from obtaining
a valid security interest in the automobile until the original lien was
terminated.""
The above authority is hardly conclusive, however, for one may
doubt that the future advance priority issue was fairly focused for
decision. The opinion is very brief and relies on 9-204(5), a section
that does not really shed any light on the priority question. Also, the
opinion stresses the fact that the amount of the loan to be secured
would be stated on the certificate of title. It is unclear why this should
be important for there is no requirement of this sort in order to
validate the interest in future advances." If one assumes that future
advances are valid only up to the amount stated, it may appear to
make the priority rule easier to live with. However, a maximum
amount requirement is really illusory protection to an intervening
lienor if the first advancer chooses to make it such by stating a very
large maximum. Finally, it is hard to believe that the Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion means what it says. The excerpt quoted above indicated
that an intervening interest would be invalid, whereas the traditional
single security interest theory would only subordinate the intervening
interest to the interest of the future advancer.
There is another argument in favor of the single security interest
theory. The first-to-file rule of 9-312(5)(a), which was examined
earlier, provides priority for all future advances, whether optional or
72 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 616.
73 California adopted a maximum amount requirement when it passed the Code in
1963. "Because of [a] long history involving the distinction between optional and oblig-
atory future advances, and because of the almost casual attention devoted to future
advances under the Code, the California version . . . incorporated a section similar in
nature to section 2975 of the Civil Code." Project, California Chattel Security and Article
Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 806, 863 (1961). The only
problem was that section 2975 (and its companion, section 2974) had a rather mysterious
past. With only one uninstructive exception, there are no reported decisions interpreting
these sections, and "[do legislative history has been found which might throw light on
their meaning or function." California Law Revision Commission, Recommendation and
Study Relating to Mortgages to Secure Future Advances C-15 (1958).
Perhaps this ambiguity led the California Law Revision Commission to conclude that
since "Article 9 embodies an integrated approach to security transactions different from
that of the present California law it seemed unwise to consider §1 9-204 and 9-312 as
possible models for revising §§ 2974 and 2975 of the Civil Code. Piecemeal adoption of
bits and pieces of Article 9 would tend toward confusion, rather than clarity." Id. at C-24
n.49.
What finally happened in California was just the opposite: adoption of Article 9 out-
right, with the counterpart of §§ 2974 and 2975 added on "piecemeal" as 9-312(7). Note
26 supra. Unfortunately, as little is known of 9-312(7) as was understood about its pre-
Code ancestor. In 1965 it was repealed, virtually without comment. Cf. Review of 1965
Code Legislation 102 (CEB 1965). Professor Gilmore suggests, however, that the cautious
and wise lender will voluntarily state the maximum amount that he intends to lend. 2 G.
Gilmore, supra note 61, at 932-33.
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obligatory, against intervening Code interests which are perfected
by filing. In the present situation, where the intervening interest is a
Code interest perfected other than by filing, what is the rationale
for changing the rule of 9-312(5) (a)? It may be conceded that
9-312(5) (a) is not the best way to accommodate all of the interests
involved, but it is nevertheless a clear and certain rule as exemplified
by the Code comments. It is the clarity of the result under 9-312(5) (a)
which justifies the single security interest view under 9-312 (5) (b) ;
for to apply the single security interest theory in a 9-312(5)(a) case
and then apply the multiple security interest theory in a 9-312(5) (b)
case is "too legalistic and seems to defeat the purpose of Article 9 in
executing its concept of notice filing. . . . There seems to be no reason
for reaching a different result when [the subsequent advancer] took
possession of the collateral instead of filing a financing statement.
The result should be the same in each situation." 74
 Of course a pledgee
is not as likely to refer to the filing records as one who is required to
file in order to perfect, but a reasonably cautious pledgee will prob-
ably do so. Thus the pledgee will be in exactly the same position as
the perfection-by-filing interest, with respect to notice of the prior
security interest; there is no compelling reason for favoring the
pledgee.
Finally, an English analogy provides a justification for construing
the priority of a future advance interest rather broadly. The multiple
security interest theory, as did pre-Code law, would recognize a dif-
ference between obligatory and optional advances. One writer has
suggested that the difference is not at all clear, and that the distinction,
if it is one, serves only the purpose of allowing the courts to decide
priority questions on an "ad hoc or ad hontinem" 75
 basis. Although
this view may be overly skeptical, the point is well taken that some-
times optional advances take on the characteristics of obligatory
advances; perhaps the law should treat both equally.
One may distinguish three cases: (1) where the secured party
is bound to make advances, (2) where he has the right to make the
advances independently of the debtor's will, and (3) where he may
make advances only if both he and the debtor agree that he shall
74 Goodwin, Priorities in Secured Transactions—Article 9, Uniform Commercial
Code, 20 Bus. Law. 877, 895-6 (July 1965). See also Lee, Perfection and Priorities Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Wyo. L.J. 1, 43 (1962). The argument assumes that
the future advance interest itself is perfected by filing. This assumption is not necessarily
so, of course, although the future advance interest is traditionally used with inventory
collateral, a security interest which is perfected by filing. U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 3.
If the future advance interest is perfected other than by filing, the single security
interest theory may produce bizarre and undesirable results. For a hypothetical example,
see Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Harv. L.
Rev. 997, 1029 n.82 (1964).
75 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 61, at 930.
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do so. The second arrangement vests an important right in the secured
party: the right to make an economically required advance. An exam-
ple is a construction mortgage where the secured party has the right
to complete the structure and have a lien for completion advances
which is superior to the interests of interveners." In the personal
property area, advances for the protection, maintenance, preservation
or repair of the collateral are within the same doctrine. It seems essen-
tial to protect these economically dictated advances. Furthermore,
when the secured party has a right to make the advance independently
of the will of the debtor, a contractual interest is created which de-
serves protection. This rationale seems to have found its way into
English law," although American courts were far from clear about
whether to apply it or not." California recognized the importance of
advances to preserve collateral, and provided in its version of 9-312
that they were entitled to priority over intervening interests." The
California priority changes were repealed after a couple of years in
operation, but the advances-to-protect-collateral rule has received
favorable comments° 'Whether courts will grant priority to advances
to protect collateral is just as unclear, of course, as the general prob-
lem of priority under 9-312. The realization that advances may start
out being optional, and wind up being required, however, heightens
the argument that all advances should be treated equally under the
single security interest theory.
On the other hand, the uncertainty of the priority rules may
allow a court to re-introduce the pre-Code actual notice rule. Suppose,
for example, that an intervening Code lender decides to send the prior
lender actual notice of his intervention. This is easily accomplished,
because the first creditor's financing statement gives his name and
address to the public. The problem is that knowledge or notice is
generally not relevant to the rules of 9-312. Section 1-203, however,
imposes an obligation of good faith on the performance or enforce-
ment of every contract embraced by the Code. Is it bad faith to
advance money contrary to the interests of a known intervener? The
Code provides no answer to this question, but it is worth noting that
in England the answer is yes.' If the English rule is considered
76 Cf. Note, Comparison of Real Property Mortgages and Security Interests in Chat-
tels to Secure Future Advances, 36 Conn. B.J. 463 (1962).
77 Cf. West v. Williams, [1899] 1 Ch. 132; Annot. 138 A.L.R. 566 (1942).
78 Compare Cedar v. Roche Fruit Co., 16 Wash. 2d 652, 134 P.2d 437 (1943) with
Elmendorf -Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 10 Wash. 2d 29, 116 P.2d 253 (1941).
79 Note 26 supra.
89 Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Harv.
L. Rev, 997 (1964). Professor Coogan's views were instrumental in causing the repeal of
9-312 (7). See Review of 1965 Code Legislation 102 (CEB 1965).
Si Cf. Deeley v. Lloyds Bank [1912] A.C. 756.
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desirable, it may be adopted, since 9-312 is not clearly contra, but the
chances are not great that any court will reach this conclusion."
This possibility aside, however, the argument so far has shown
that the Code affords priority to the future advancer, whether the
advances are optional or obligatory, against intervening Code security
interests. Having said this, one must ask whether it says too much,
whether such protection for future advances is unwarranted. The
main problem is that the priority rules as they have been outlined
may operate to lock a debtor into the service of his first creditor.
Although this possibility did not disturb the Attorney General of
Wyoming, it was responsible for the overruling of Gordon v. Graham. 83
The General Counsel of the United States Savings and Loan League
has stated that as a matter of sound business policy and fairness
future advances should be limited to a stated maximum amount,"
but a limiting legal doctrine is more comfortable. Some legal doctrines,
however, do limit the impact of future advance priority.
3. Limitations on Future Advance Priority
In order to explore the principles and rules limiting the future
advance priority, one might again look to English law. One of the
Lords dissenting in Hopkinson v. Rolt" suggested that any inter-
vening creditor could protect himself against a future advance by
entering into a promise with the debtor that he will not make loans
with the first creditor. A similar device was popular in America fol-
lowing the depression and is called a negative pledge agreement."
The main problem with the negative pledge is that it is not easily
enforced. Even if liquidated damages are provided, the promisee will
have difficulty in ascertaining that there has been a breach of the
promise. He may not discover the breach until the future advancer
moves to foreclose his interest, or until insolvency proceedings are
initiated against the debtor. In either case, it is not likely that the
debtor will be in a position to make good the liquidated damage
provision of his negative pledge agreement. Moreover, the negative
pledge did not create a legal or equitable lien under pre-Code law,
nor is it likely to create a Code security interests? One recent case
82 Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 234 A.2d 860, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 821 (1967).
Cf. 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 61, at 942; Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 Harv. I.. Rev.
838, 859 n.80 (1959). But see Friedlander v. Adelphi Mfg. Co., 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 7
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1968).
83 22 Eng. Rep. 502, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 598 (1716).
84 Russell & Prather, The Flexible Mortgage Contract, 19 Legal Bull. 73, 81 (1953) ;
cf. 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 61, at 933.
85 11 Eng. Rep. 829, 9 H.L.C. 513 (1861).
86 See generally 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 61, at 999-1019.
87 Coogan, Kripke and Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordination Agree-
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has suggested the possibility that the promisee can enforce the promise
in an action against the transferee of the property subject to the
negative pledge, but this result seems unlikely. 88 Thus, a negative
pledge clause will be fairly useless unless the promisee can discover
the breach while the debtor is still solvent."
The Code itself provides for certain interests to intervene between
the future advancer's loans. A security interest in accessions, for
example, may cut across the priority of a future advancer. As was
shown before, the future advance interest in this special situation is
subject to the actual notice rule." Similarly, the purchasers of col-
lateral in the form of chattel paper, instruments and documents may
take priority over prior-perfected security interests."
Even more important is the super-priority that is accorded the
purchase money interest. Despite some early confusion as to whether
a purchase money security interest would break the future advance
priority," it is now accepted that the purchase money interest takes
priority over prior security interests and over future advances made
pursuant to a prior security interest." Section 9-107 defines purchase
money security interest, but it will be convenient to return to that
definition at a later time; generally, the interest results from the
addition of new value to the debtor in the form of new collateral or
funds with which to acquire new collateral.
The ability of a purchase money security interest to cut across
a future advance interest depends upon the collateral which is the
subject of the purchase money interest. In the case of an interest in
inventory, section 9-312(3) provides that the intervening party must
notify the prior secured party. The prior party, upon receiving notice,
will presumably not make any advances." One of the leading com-
ments, Security Interests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and Partici-
pation Agreements, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 229, 263-66 (1965).
88 Cf. Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265 (1964). The impli-
cations of 9-311, moreover, indicate that the transferee is protected.
39 Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured
Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 838, 876 (1959), mentions other
contractual devices that an intervening creditor may use to stop the future advance
priority.
99 U.C.C. § 9-314(3).
94 U.C.C. II 9-308, 9-309.
92 Project, California Chattel Security and Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 806, 924 (1961).
93 See generally Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1333
(1963). It is strange that this result should ever have been doubted in view of Comment
8 to 9-204.
94 Although the Code does not specify the period of time for which notice of the
purchase money interest will be operative, it is most likely that a five-year life will be
applied by analogy to 9-403(2). Kripke, Suggestions for Clarifying Article 9: Intangibles,
Proceeds, and Priorities, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 687, 720 (1966). But see Gilmore, The Purchase
Money Priority, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1333, 1380 (1963).
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mentators on the Code expressed the hope that the provisions of
9-312(3) would be a dead letter, but a more recent opinion suggests
that the purchase money device is being used extensively in some
fields." It must be noted that the notice provisions of 9-312(3) apply
only to purchase money interests in inventory; when the collateral is
anything other than inventory, 9-312(4) controls, and notice to the
prior secured party is not required. Indeed, this purchase money
interest is even allowed a ten-day grace period for filing without
sacrificing its priority." The operation of 9-312(4) has caused Pro-
fessor Gilmore to comment as follows:
It is not suggested that this result is wrong, but it is clear
that [a future advancer] cannot make his [first] advance
with any assurance that 9-312(5) gives him priority over
security interests which represent intervening advances. Nor
can he tell by checking the files whether any such security
interests are entitled to the purchase money priority: a
financing statement on file would not in all probability dis-
close the fact that a purchase money interest was involved.
. . . The upshot of the discussion is that a lender, before
agreeing to make future advances, should ponder the possible
effect of 9-312(4)0 7
It is just this possible effect on a future advancer that may lead
one to conclude that there should be no future advance priority for
optional advances in the first place." Since the future advancer runs
the risk of an intervening 9-312(4) interest, so the argument goes,
he will be checking the filing records to guard against the purchase
money interest, and thus the policy of notice filing is undermined.
This argument is partially offset by Gilmore's analysis set out above;
since the record does not disclose which subsequent interests are pur-
chase money, and which are not, the future advancer may never check.
Moreover, the extent to which the 9-312(4) priority will be bother-
some to a future advancer is unknown. The Comments to 9-312 reveal
that the authors of the Code did not expect the problem to occur
in areas other than inventory financing, where notice is required.
Currently, traditional lending patterns are prevailing and a sharp
clash between the future advance interest and the non-inventory
purchase money security interest has not occurred."
9 .) L. Hellerstein and S. Hellerstein, Secured Transactions Under Article 9, Uniform
Commercial Code of Colorado 87 (1967). But see 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 61, at 786.
99 	§ 9-312(4).
97 Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1333, 1386-87 (1963).
09 Cf. Note, Mortgages Securing Future Advances—A Need for Legislation, 47 Iowa
L. Rev. 432, 448 (1962). However, the possibility of a subsequent purchase money in-
terest is a threat to any interest given priority by 9-312(5).
99 Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1333, 1370 ( 1963).
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Another interest that inay intervene between advances is demon-
strated by 9-310, which provides that statutory liens on goods in the
possession of those who furnish services or material with respect
to such goods take priority over a perfected security interest unless
the statute which creates the lien provides otherwise. This interest
may be thought of as a new value interest, in the same class as a
purchase money interest. Since it operates only pursuant to state
legislative policy, it presents no unusual challenge to the priority for
future advances.
A buyer of collateral may also be protected under the Code
against the future advance priority." The policy of 9-307 seems to
be based on the desirability of keeping the channels of commerce
free, by allowing a dealer to sell his inventory free of his financer's
security interest. However, 9-307 may not go far enough in its pro-
tection against the future advance interest. One notable group that
is not protected by 9-307 is bulk sale transferees."' To subject them
to the uncertainty of a subsequent advance may unduly hinder the
debtor from selling his business in bulk. The transferee, however, is
required to give notice to the transferor's creditors' and thus must
know of the prior future advance interest. Perhaps it is not asking too
much if the bulk transferee is expected to pay off and terminate the
future advance interest as a practical requirement of the bulk sale.
This conclusion is supported by 6-107 which requires the transferee
to state whether or not he intends to assume the liabilities of the bulk
seller.
Other buyers not included in the protection of 9-307 are buyers
at execution sales held to enforce the interest of a judgment lien
creditor.'" Some Code commentators feel that any type of buyer is
free of the future advance priority.'" Professor Kripke has said of
the problem that "it seems to me that this could not happen and that
after the [collateral] has been sold, [the creditor] could not increase
its security interest on the [collateral] by a later advance."' On the
other hand, some commentators insist that the future advance priority
extends to buyers as well as to other intervening interests." While
1° ° 	 § 9-307.
101 	§ 1-201(9).
102 	§ 6-105.
103 U.C.C. 	 1-201(9).
104 E.g., Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 1029 n.82 (1964) ; cf. the silence of Gilmore, supra note 61, at
942-46.
105 Kripke, Recapitulation of Priority Problems Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 13 Prac. Law. No. 323, 29 (March, 1967).
100 E.g., Goodwin, Priorities in Secured Transactions Article 9, Uniform Commercial
Code, 20 Bus. Law. 877, 894-97 (July, 1965) ; cf. Lee, Perfection and Priorities Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Wyo. L.J. 1, 37-38 (1962).
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it may be impossible to reconcile these two views, one must at least
plan for the possibility that the problem will arise. The broad impact
of 9-201, and the implications of 9-307 indicate that the buyer of
collateral will be as subject to the future advance priority as other
intervening interests.
Recently, it has been argued that the Code protection of buyers
under 9-307 should extend to buyers at an execution sale, 107 although
it is acknowledged that both the Code as written and the decided cases
exclude these buyers from 9-307's ambit.'" Rephrased, the problem
is the extent to which a judgment lien creditor can intervene. Section
9-311 is the operative Code provision, providing that the debtor has
an interest in the collateral subject to a security interest, and that
this interest may be levied upon by judicial process. It may be asserted
that 9-311 preserves for the levying creditor only what the debtor
himself had. Since the debtor is bound by his future advance agree-
ment in accordance with 9-201, he retains only a very speculative
and contingent interest in the future advance situation and 'this is all
that passes to the levying creditor. However, the above interpretation
would cut seriously into whatever substance 9-311 contains, trans-
forming it into a virtually meaningless section when faced by a future
advance interest. Since no provision of the Code should be allowed
to become meaningless, the very presence of 9-311 argues that a
creditor should be able to interrupt the future advance sequence. In
a general way, the existence of 9-311 thus supports the multiple
security interest view.'"
In practice, however, the levying creditor may not be harmed
by the application of a future advance priority. If he succeeds in
getting the execution sale held before the subsequent advance is
made, he has realized on the debtor's equity and cannot complain;
the risk is now on the buyer at the execution sale, as discussed above.
This may cause the proceeds of the sale to be extremely low, although
perhaps not appreciably lower than at any judicial auction, where
property is sold subject to various unknown claims which may be
prior to the buyer's interest."D If the execution sale is not held until
after a future advance is made, the property will be subject to a
larger prior interest, but the debtor's estate has been increased by
the advanced cash. However, it may be that cash is so easily dis-
107 Note, Protection of a Buyer at an Execution Sale Under U.C.C. Section 9-307, 9
B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 97 (1967).
108 Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Parker, — N.H. —, 242 A.2d 69, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
397 (1968) ; National Shawmut Bank v. Vera, 352 Mass. 11, 223 N.E.2d 515 (1967).
100 P. Coogan, Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," in
Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code 705-9 (1967).
110 V. Countryman, Debtor and Creditor 111 (1964).
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sipated that the levying creditor will not be able to "turn around"
in time to collect his judgment from this new fund.
One can only say that the Code is unclear on the point. In the
case of the levying creditor, the solution to the problem is difficult.
It might be easiest to apply the general rule of priority for future
advances, as has been discussed and generally advocated throughout
this article. On the other hand, it is only by implication from
9-301(1)(b)" that the Code has anything at all to say about the
conflict between a security interest and a judgment lien creditor. It
is worth noting in this regard that the pre-1956 version of 9-312
provided that:
A secured party who has a perfected security interest and
who makes later advances to the debtor on the same collateral
and under the same security agreement takes priority as to
the later advances from the time when his security interest
was originally perfected.'"
Thus, at one time the Code purported to apply the substance of what
is now 9-312(5) (b) to judgment creditors. It is difficult to infer
the intent of the draftsmen from their revision of that section. Did
they mean to exclude the judgment lien creditor problem from the
Code and leave it to non-Code state law? Or did they mean to have
the idea of the pre-1956 version carry over to the revised version
in 9-312(5) ?113
At least one recent case has adopted the single security interest
theory against a creditor who attempted, by execution and levy, to
break a future advancer's hold on a debtor. In Friedlander v. Ade1phi
mfg. Co 1 14 a security interest covering a stated indebtedness of
111 Section 9-301(1) (b) provides that an unperfected security interest is subordi-
nate to the rights of a lien creditor without knowledge of the security interest. The in-
ference is that a perfected security interest is prior to a lien creditor. This view has been
judicially adopted, e.g., Friedlander v. Ade1phi Mfg. Co., 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 7 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. 1968), even though the Code does not purport to regulate directly the rights of
non-consensual security interests, such as lien creditors. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-102, Purposes
Comment.
112 § 9-312(2)(1952 version).
113 Gilmore states: "[Tlhe draftsmen were satisfied that future advances priorities
could be satisfactorily resolved as a special instance under the general priority rules."
2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property 934 (1965). California, for one, did
not think it was all that clear, and adopted 9-312(7), supra note 26, "because of the
almost casual attention devoted to future advances under the Code ...." Project, California
Chattel Security and Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev.
806, 863 (1961). California's solution was to make the future advancer subject to • the
actual notice rule with respect to judgment liens, unless he stated a maximum amount to be
loaned or committed to obligatory advances. But again there is an ambiguity: was Cali-
fornia explicit because the problem of priority was so obvious that it was easy, or because
it wanted to change the Code rules otherwise obtaining? Also, what is the effect of the
repeal of 9-312(7) ? See note 73 supra.
114 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 7 (1968).
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$24,000 plus "any other indebtedness ... now existing or hereafter
arising, including all future advances or loans which may be made
at the option of the Secured Party . . . ." 112 was perfected by filing.
Later, a creditor obtained a judgment against the debtor, docketed the
the judgment, and levied on the property of the debtor, including
property which was used as collateral under the prior security interest.
Still later, the secured party made additional advances pursuant to his
previous security agreement. The court held that the future advancer
was entitled to priority over the judgment creditor for the full amount
of his advances, regardless of the time they were made.
The court relied on the general rule of Code § 9-201 that "a secur-
ity agreement is effective according to its terms . . . against credi-
tors."'" Also, the court felt that a present advance plus an optional
advance clause "clearly" constituted value so as to allow the security
interest to attach when the security agreement was made."' This much
of the opinion is straightforward, and consistent with the single secur-
ity interest theory advanced by Gilmore and generally advocated herein.
Two additional points in the Friedlander decision are disturbing,
however. The first is the court's assertion that pre-Code law supports
the single security interest theory.'" This statement is true in the
sense that under pre-Code law a future advancer was protected against
subsequently recorded interests. However, this protection was with-
held when the future advancer received actual notice of the subse-
quent interest. The possibility that the actual notice rule might still
exist after passage of the Code was previously discussed. If Fried-
lander now implies that the actual notice rationale carries over to the
Code, the decision is a radical one. In spite of the fact that the actual
notice rule may best accomodate the conflicting interests of secured
and unsecured creditors, notice has been thought to be irrelevant to
the problems of Code priorities.'" Furthermore, the language of
9-204(1), 9-303(1) and 9-312(5) indicates that a security interest
derives its priority when "value" is given and at no other time.
The Code does require good faith: 2° and the role played by
the good faith requirement is the second disturbing aspect of Fried-
lander. The court held that the future advance interest was entitled to
priority only if all advances were made in good faith and the issue
115 Id. at 8. Note that the initial advance of $24,000 was substantial and therefore
not merely a "binder" for the possibility of future optional advances. Also, the secured
party had the option to make future advances. As discussed previously, this type of
future advance interest presents a strong claim for protection.
116 	§ 9-201.
111 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 10.
118 Id. at 9.
110 Supra note 82.
125 	§ 1-203.
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was referred to a special referee. It is uncertain what the court had in
mind when it referred to good faith;"' it implied that there would be
lack of good faith if the future advances were "simply a method .. .
of depriving [the intervener] of its right to collection of its judg-
ment.' Under this test, any advances after knowledge of an inter-
vening interest may be considered bad faith. It is hoped, therefore,
that the court meant by "good faith" only the traditional estoppel
concepts.'" Thus, the net result under Friedlander will coincide with
the single security interest theory's protection of future advances
regardless of notice or knowledge of an intervener: 24
C. Tax Liens
The problem of the judgment lien creditor serves as an intro-
duction to the difficulties presented when a governmental body be-
comes a lien creditor. Tax liens present an additional problem be-
cause they contain their own statutory priority provisions, which must
be meshed with Code priority rules. In California, for example, the lien
for state income taxes is subsequent to any recorded lien which "at-
tached" prior to the tax lien.'" Clearly, in order to apply this rule, it
must be known when the security interest "attached," and all of the
problems discussed earlier, in regard to the single-multiple security in-
terest dichotomy, are raised again. Even more unclear, however, is the
status of a future advance interest when the intervening tax claim is
on behalf of the United States Government. In addition to lack of
clarity in the Code, there is a new and complex Federal Tax Lien Act.
Before examining the provisions of the 1966 Tax Lien Act:" it
is helpful to have the pre-1966 law clearly in mind. The issue of the
priority between a future advance interest and an intervening federal
lien was presented to the Supreme Court as early as 1805. United
121 There has been no final disposition of the case as of this writing.
122 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 11.
123 Cf. Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 234 A.2d 860, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 821 (1967) ;
P. Coogan, How to Create Security Interests Under the Code—And Why, in Secured
Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code 177 n.26 (1967).
12 There are statutes in two states which may require the future advancer to take
account of intervening creditors of whom he has knowledge. In Cailfornia, under Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code 13 689(b) (West 1955), and in Massachusetts, under Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 223, 75 (1958), an attaching creditor may serve notice of his attachment on the
secured party, who then states his "claimed debt." If the attaching creditor does not
pay the claimed amount within the statutory period, his attachment is dissolved. So far,
however, there has been no indication that this statutory system will interrupt the future
advance interest, although both states have amended their "buy out" statutes since pas-
sage of the Code, thus indicating that somehow the Code and the "buy out" statute were
intended to work together. They seem hopelessly at odds in the future advance situation.
See Barnard v. Moore, 90 Mass. 273 (1864).
125 Cal. Rev. and Taxation Code § 18933 (West 1956).
12(1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 6321-6325. Hereafter referred to as the Tax Lien Act.
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States v. Hooel" involved a security deed made in January and pro-
viding for future advances, and a federal lien perfected in August,
prior to several of the later advances. Mr. Justice Marshall spoke for
the Court:
That the property stood bound for future advances is, in
itself, unexceptionable. . . . It is frequent for a person who
expects to become more considerably indebted, to mortgage
property to his creditors, as a security for debts to be con-
tracted, as well as for that which is already due. . . . It will
barely be observed, that the validity of this conveyance is to
be tested by the statutes of Virginia which embrace this
subject.'"
The lien of the later advance was held superior to the federal claim,
probably on the basis of the majority rule of pre-Code law, the actual
notice rule. Thus, in the few states that followed the Old English rule
of priority, future advances would always win over the federal lien;
in the minority of states where the Michigan rule applied, the future
advance interest would always lose to the federal lien; and in the vast
majority of states, optional future advances were subject to actual no-
tice of the intervening federal lien.
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent,
however, R. S. 3466' 29
 provides that the debts due the United States
shall be first satisfied. The Supreme Court has never held that the
absolute priority accorded by R. S. 3466 would overcome a fully per-
fected and specific lien upon the property, since there was always some
reason for finding that the lien involved was not sufficiently specific
and perfected.'" "The long-established rule requires that the lien must
be definite, and not merely ascertainable in the future by taking
further steps, in at least three respects as of the crucial time. These are:
(1) the identity of the lienor. . .; (2) the amount of the lien. . .; and
(3) the property to which it attaches. . . ." 191 In several early deci-
sions, the Supreme Court by dictum read into R. S. 3466 an exception
in the case of previously executed mortgages.' The doctrine was
based on the title theory, but was applied by the lower courts even in
lien theory states.'"
Gradually, the specificity tests under R. S. 3466 were taken over
127 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 73 (1805).
128 Id. at 89.
	 .
120 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964).
130 United States v. Saidman, 231 F.2d 503, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
131 Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946).
132 United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 484-85 (1941).
133 E.g., Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co 246 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 868 (1957).
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by federal tax lien acts and applied even in proceedings where the
debtor was solvent and R. S. 3466 was inapplicable."' Thus, the fed-
eral lien for taxes would prevail over interests that were not suffi-
ciently "choate."' The choateness test began to go farther than its
ancestor, however, for judicial dicta indicated that it applied to con-
tractual liens.'" The Internal Revenue Service picked up this lead,
and issued Revenue Ruling 56-41" 7 to the effect that mortgages to
secure future advances were not choate as to advances made after filing
of the tax lien. The ruling drew no distinctions between optional and
obligatory advances, and therefore applied to both types.'" The ruling
also took a stricter position in regard to the effect of state law on the
interests of the parties. Instead of Marshall's deference to state deter-
minations, the ruling•rovided that "although a state court's classifica-
tion of a lien as specific and perfected is entitled to weight, it is subject
to reexamination by the [federal] courts."'"
The high water mark of this trend came when the Supreme Court
held that a surety's obligation was secured by an inchoate instru-
ment.'" A subcontractor assigned to the surety all sums to become due
under its work contracts, as security for all liability of the surety
under its bond with the general contractor. In a mysterious per curiam
opinion, the Court held by a vote of five to four that the surety's
security interest was inchoate and subject to the tax lien against the
subcontractor. Thus, a leading commentator on tax liens was able to
say that a "security interest, regardless of protection under state law,
and regardless of whether providing for optional or obligatory ad-
vances, was inchoate in the federal sense until advances were actually
made, and then only valid to the extent of disburseinents made before
the lien was filed."' This summary may not have been entirely cor-
rect, however, for in a 1961 case the Supreme Court seemed to attach
some importance to the fact that the future advancer was not obligated
to make the advance that was denied priority over the federal lien."
134 V. Countryman, Debtor and Creditor 466 (1964).
135 "This word is described in Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed., as
'rare,' and does not appear at all in Funk and Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary
(1923 ed.). We do not find it particularly couth, and use it only because the Supreme
Court has revived it in federal tax lien cases" Hammes v. Tucson Newspapers, Inc., 324
F.2d 101, 102 n.1 (9th Cir. 1963).
130 Cf. Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 upon Security In-
terests Created Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1378 (1968)
(hereinafter cited as Tax Liens).
137 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 562.
138 But see Prather, Federal Liens as They Affect Mortgage Lending, 13 Bus. Law.
118, 122-23 (Nov. 1967).
13° 1956-1 Cum. Bull. at 563; see also note 147 infra.
140 United States v. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
141 W. Plumb & L. Wright, Federal Tax Liens 78 (1967).
142 United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 91 (1963).
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Furthermore, the lower courts were not unanimous in their hostility to
the future advancer."'
Against this background, the Tax Lien Act was passed in 1966.
The purposes of the new Act were, among others, (1) to conform the
lien provisions of the internal revenue laws to the concepts developed
in the Code, and (2) to improve substantially the status of secured
creditors.'" Unfortunately, the new Act does nothing to clear up the
mysterious relationship between its own priority provisions and the
rules under R. S. 3466. It has been argued that the new act is com-
prehensive on the subject of tax lien priorities and that the R. S. 3466
tests should no longer be applied, but this contention has been rejected
by the Fourth Circuit.' Thus, under present law, the Commissioner
may have a choice of priority rules when the debtor is insolvent.
Section 6323(b) of the Tax Lien Act provides that certain inter-
ests will be valid against the tax lien even though the notice of tax
lien has been properly filed. In other words, 6323(b) interests are
entitled to "super-priority," and are protected regardless of the action
taken by the taxing authority. Recently, the Internal Revenue Service
has announced in Rev. Rul. 68-57 that "a purchase money security
interest or mortgage valid under local law is protected even though it
may arise after a notice of Federal tax lien has been filed."' Thus,
the Service has admitted a new interest to the super-priority category.
Since the interest is judged by local law,'" it seems that if the future
advancer can fit himself into the mold of section 9-107 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, all future advances will be good as against an in-
tervening tax lien (at least when the debtor is solvent).
Section 9-107 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] security in-
terest is a 'purchase money security interest' to the extent that it is ...
taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation
gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of col-
lateral if such value is in fact so used."' It is clear that there can
be no purchase money security interest created in satisfaction of a
pre-existing claim or antecedent debt, for no present consideration is
added. But it seems that future advances, if restricted to the permitted
uses, can be the basis of the super-priority interest. In order to meet
143 E.g., United States v. Lebanon Woolen Mills Corp., 241 F. Supp. 393, 396 n.3,
397 n.4 (D.N.H. 1964).
144 H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) ; S. Rep. No. 1708, 3 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3722, 3723 (1966).
145 H.R. Agsten & Sons, Inc. v. Huntington Trust & Say. Bank, 388 F.2d 156,
160 (4th Cir. 1967).
146 Rev. Rul. 68-57, 1968 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 6 at 24, T.I.R. 957 (Jan. 11, 1968).
147 But see generally Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Cohen,
The Binding Effect of State Court Determinations in Federal Tax Proceedings, 4 Harv.
Legal Comm. 245 (1967).
148 	§ 9-107(b).
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the requirements of 9-107, the advancer will require that his advances
be used to purchase new collateral, for example inventory, and will
have an after-acquired property clause included in his security agree-
ment. Unfortunately, one referee in bankruptcy has decided that there
can be no purchase money security interest which includes future ad-
vances."' The opinion is based on very weak reasoning,"° and shows a
hostility for future advances that should have been put to rest by
9-204(5). It does not appear that the creditor had an after-acquired
property clause. This is crucial, for admittedly the future advances
cannot be used to acquire collateral as contemplated by 9-107(b) if
new property is not subject to the security interest. However, the
referee's opinion does not rest on this technical ground, but invalidates
the purchase money interest because a future advance clause was in-
cluded in the security agreement.' For the reasons mentioned, In
re Simpson is wrong; hopefully future advancers will be able to avail
themselves of Revenue Ruling 68-57 to achieve super-priority.
Short of this, the future advancer still has other havens in the
new Tax Lien Act. Section 6323(a) provides that the tax lien is not
valid as against holders of security interests where the rights under
the security interest are acquired prior to the filing of the tax lien.
The definition of security interest in section 6323(h) (1) presents
problems for the future advancer, however, because the interest exists
only if (1) "the interest has become protected under local law against
a subsequent judgment lien" on a simple contract, and (2) "to the
extent that . . . the holder has parted with money or money's
worth.' This latter phrase is troubling.
One of the purposes of the new Act is to correlate the taxing
statute with the Code, and if this purpose indicates that "money's
worth" is the equivalent of "value," the analysis is simplified. Obliga-
tory future advances will be fully protected and optional advances
149 In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 243, 4 C.C.H. Instal. Credit Guide If 98,053
(W.D. Mich. 1966). See also In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 250, 4 C.C.H. Instal.
Credit Guide 98,054 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
150 Section 9-107 specifically provides that a purchase money security interest may
be held by one who makes advances. Comment 2 to 9-107 is to the same effect. The
Referee felt that this language indicated that a future advance clause disqualified the
purchase money aspect of a security interest. The best that can be said of the Referee's
reasoning is that it is contrary to specific provisions in the Code. The Referee also
raises his opinion over the words of the Code with the simple observation that the drafts-
men probably forgot about future advances when they wrote 9-107. To support this con-
clusion, he produces another contrary citation: Comment 8 to 9-204, which attempts
to dispel judicial hostility to future advances. Finally the Referee cites a pre-Code con-
ditional sales decision, which is probably overruled by the passage of the Code. See
United States v. Lebanon Woolen Mills Corp., 241 F. Supp. 393, 395, (D.N.H. 1964).
151 The presence of the future advance clause, not the operation of it, was solely
responsible for the decision because no future advances were ever made.
152 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(h)(l).
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may be protected, depending upon how that question is resolved under
the Code. Most of the commentators, however, reject this reading of
"money's worth."153
 Moreover, 1-201(44) seems to look only to a
minimal threshold of value in order to validate a contractual interest,
whereas section 6323(h) (1) looks to the extent of the "money's
worth" that is supplied. Thus, section 6323(h) (1) imports quantita-
tive evaluation, a notion that is carried over from uses of the term
"money's worth" elsewhere in the tax code.'
Even under this view, however, at least obligatory advances
should constitute "money's worth". The promise to lend can probably
be valued, although there may be some element of discount involved?'
and the taxing authority is benefited by the fact that funds are com-
mitted to the debtor's estate. Furthermore, an obligatory advance
clause gives the creditor a definite contractual interest in the debtor-
creditor relationship which is analogous to the contractual rights of
the holder of an option. Since an option is protected against the tax
lien?" its security interest counterpart should also be protected.
Finally, the future advance either adds funds or allows the debtor to
purchase property, to which the government's lien may attach. If, in
addition, the lien of the advance is subordinated to the tax lien, "the
lender is made an unwitting contributor to the government's coffers,
and can be pictured as a victim of its greed." 157
 These arguments may
save the obligatory or "quasi-obligatory" advancer the burden of
searching elsewhere in the Tax Lien Act for protection.' But since
they will probably not avail the optional advancer, sections 6323(c)
and (d) must be examined.'" The following analysis will be equally
relevant to the obligatory advancer if his prior arguments have been
rejected.'"
Section 6323(d) protects the future advancer who makes dis-
bursements within forty-five days after the tax lien filing, provided the
advancer has no actual notice of the tax lien and has a security in-
terest which is "protected under local law against a judgment lien
153 W. Plumb and L. Wright, supra note 135 at 79; Young, Priority of the Federal
Tax Lien, 34 U. CM. L. Rev. 723, 738-39 (1967).
151 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1(a) (1968).
155 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (b) -4 (a) (1968).
156 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 6323(a), 6323(h) (6) (C).
157 Young, supra note 153, at 733.
158 Compare Tax Liens, supra note 136 at 1391 with Plumb, Federal Liens and
Priorities—Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 Yale L.J. 605, 670 (1968).
159 Concerning future advances only, and except as qualified herein, section 6323(c)
and (d) are virtually identical in relevant language, and will be discussed together as if
section 6323W) existed by itself. Under section 6323(c), the interest may include after-
acquired property, but is limited to advances made in the ordinary course of the debtor's
business and only against certain specified kinds of collateral. For a complete discussion,
see Tax Liens, supra note 136.
189 Cf. W. Plumb & L. Wright, supra note 141, at 81 n.48.
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arising, as of the time of tax lien filing, out of an unsecured obliga-
tion." 181 The latter requirement of 6323 (d) (2) may be interpreted in
several ways. One is the interpretation that is implied by one of the
few cases on the new Tax Lien Act, United States v. Strollo 1B 2 The
Strollo court construed the "protected under" language, in effect, as
requiring full perfection in the Code sense. This seems clearly incor-
rect, for if the interest must be fully perfected to obtain the benefit of
6323 (d), it is hard to see how the interest can, at the same time, come
into existence after the tax lien filing as is required under 6323(d).
The more intelligent analysis is that the draftsmen of the tax lien
sought to deal with the problem of notice filing under the Code, in
advance of the actual attachment of the security interest. Thus, the
advance filing protects the security interest in gestation against a filed
tax lien, provided that the security interest comes into existence within
forty-five days of the tax lien filing, and before actual notice of the
tax lien.
A second interpretation of 6323 (d) (2), as tentatively suggested
by Professor Young,'" is that, given the above analysis, an advance
filing per se protects the security interest from the tax lien for the
stipulated period. This view overlooks the language of the cited sec-
tions to the effect that the degree of protection must be judged under
local law. Since the Code is the local law in all states but Louisiana, a
filed security interest is protected against a tax lien for the stipulated
period only if the interest is, under state law, protected against a hypo-
thetical judgment lien. Even this formulation allows two interpreta-
tions, because, as was noted previously, the relationship between the
Code and judgment liens is not clear.
Under the first of the two possible interpretations, the priority of
the hypothetical judgment lien may be judged by non-Code law. Thus,
under the majority rule, obligatory advances are fully protected and
optional advances are protected to the point of actual notice. The
problem is that the Tax Lien Act, while giving the tax lien the status
of a hypothetical judgment lien, does not say whether or not the hypo-
thetical lienor gives hypothetical actual notice to the optional future
advancer. If the Internal Revenue Service or the courts decide that
such notice is not implied, optional advances would be protected for
forty-five days, provided that the advancer complies with the other
terms of section 6323 (d)164
Under the second possible interpretation, the priority of the hypo-
161 Tnt. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 6323(c) (1) (B), 6323(d) (2). Subsequent references
to § 6323(d) include a duplicate reference to the corresponding language in § 6323(c).
102 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. II 9.142, 201 So. 2d 466 (Fla. App. 1966).
163 Young, supra note 153, at 738.
164 Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities—Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 Yale
L.J. 605, 657-61 (1968).
35
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
thetical judgment lien may be judged by Code law. In the prior dis-
cussion of judgment liens the argument was presented that 9-311,
9-201, and 9-301(1) (b) taken together indicate that judgment liens
take subject to a perfected security interest covering future advances.
Under this view, obligatory advances are protected, and optional ad-
vances are saved if the single security interest theory is adopted, but
not if the multiple security interest view prevails. The corollary to
this proposition is that if the multiple security interest theory is
adopted, section 6323(d) does not apply to optional advances, be-
cause under the multiple security interest view, optional advances are
not protected under local law against a judgment lien as required by
section 6323 (d) (2). However, if, because of the multiple security inter-
est view, section 6323(d) does not cover optional advances, then it must
apply to obligatory advances if it is to have any meaning at all. The
argument was previously advanced that obligatory advances were
"money's worth" under section 6323(h), and were therefore protected
under 6323 (a). Now, however, it is seen that this argument can only be
made if the single security interest theory is adopted under the Code.
For under the multiple security interest theory, obligatory advances
are covered by section 6323 (d) and therefore are probably not covered
by section 6323(a) also, unless one admits that both-sections 6323 (a)
and 6323(d) cover obligatory advances. 105
 Thus, the multiple security
interest theory is inconsistent with the view that obligatory advances
are "money's worth" under section 6323 (h).
IV. CONCLUSION
Most of the problems raised by the future advance interest have
not yet formed the basis for litigation. Perhaps this fact suggests that
the Code is workable, even though it seems opaque. On the other hand,
the next few years may see future advance problems very much before
the courts. In either event, it is probably not wise to be overly dog-
matic about how future advances should be treated; any rule has its
strengths and weaknesses of application. Professors Coogan and Gil-
more may disagree on interpretations, but both have stated that
changes in the future advance rules should come cautiously, after ex-
perience shows where push is necessary, and where pull is desirable!"
At least three general areas of consideration should be focused."'
105 Section 6323(a) comes into play because the interests defined in § 6323(h) are
protected by § 6323(a). But the dualism contemplated in the text would be nonsensical
because § 6323(a) provides full protection for the obligatory advance interest, whereas
§§ 6323(d) protects only 45 days' worth.
isa 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property 930 (1965); P. Coogan,
Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," in Secured Transactions
Under the Uniform Commercial Code 723 (1967).
167 Cf. Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77
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First, a choice must be made between the single security interest and
the multiple security interest theories. The split of opinion on this
threshold issue makes the choice impossible to avoid. Since it is a
threshold issue, however, one must not overlook the possibility that
different priority rules may apply in different situations. For example,
judgment creditors may be treated differently than consensual credi-
tors. Also, one must be aware of sub-priority rules, especially those
concerning purchase money interests, that operate to put slack in any
general rule or theory.
Second, those who buy collateral that is subject to a future ad-
vance interest present a vital problem. On the whole, it seems that
9-307 does not go far enough to protect these buyers. The unsecured
creditor should be permitted to reach the debtor's equity with some
measure of finality, and the debtor should be allowed to sell effectively
his interest in the collateral. This issue is all the more vital when one
realizes that the priority of the federal tax lien may depend upon the
rights of a judgment creditor.
Finally, and perhaps independently of the priority rules, 9-208
must be vitalized. The concept of notice filing is central to the Code,
but notice is only effective if information can be obtained outside the
record. Section 9-208 tries to facilitate this process, but its function is
unclear, and its operation ambiguous. Perhaps broadening the scope
of 9-208 will allow an easier resolution of the other problems of the
future advance interest.
Harv. L. Rev. 997, 1035-36 (1964) ; Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 838, 873-
80 (1959); Comment, Priority of Future Advances Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 128, 146-50 (1967).
37
